The economics of special and differential trade regimes by Conconi, Paola & Perroni, Carlo
The Economics of Special and Diﬀerential
Trade Regimes∗
Paola Conconi†







We examine the theoretical rationale for the granting of temporary Special
and Diﬀerential (S&D) treatment to developing countries–both in its protection
and market-access components–under the WTO agreements. S&D rules con-
stitute the centerpiece of the WTO’s strategy for integrating developing coun-
tries into the trading system, but have been criticized–both on theoretical and
empirical grounds–as being ineﬀective. We show that seemingly non-reciprocal,
limited-duration S&D treatment can be rationalized as a transitional equilibrium
feature of a self-enforcing international agreement between a large developed and
a small developing country, where the two sides have a joint interest in helping
the developing country to overcome a policy commitment problem.
KEYWORDS: International Agreements, Trade and Development, Policy Com-
mitment. JEL Classification: D72, D78, F13.
∗The first draft of this paper was prepared in November 2003 for a presentation at the Université
Libre de Bruxelles (ECARES). Subsequent versions have been presented at the second RTNWorkshop
on Trade, Industrialization and Development organized at the London School of Economics by the
CEPR, at the Mid-West International Economics Group Spring 2004 Meeting, at the First conference
on Research in International Economics and Finance (RIEF) in Paris, at the Annual Conference of
the Global Studies Association on “Southern Voices and Global Order,” and at the Centre for the
Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR) of Warwick University. We wish to thank the
participants for their helpful comments. We are also grateful to Mathias Dewatripont, Max Kwiek,
Patrick Legros, Marcus Miller, André Sapir, Thierry Verdier, and John Whalley for their valuable
suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies. We gratefully acknowledge support from the ESRC and
the European Commission.
†Correspondence to Paola Conconi, European Centre for Advanced Research in Economics and
Statistics (ECARES), Université Libre de Bruxelles, Avenue F. D. Roosevelt 50, CP 114, 1050 Brussels,
Belgium; Tel: +32 (0)2 650 2345; Fax: +32 (0)2 650 4475; E-mail: pconconi@ulb.ac.be
1 Introduction
The WTO agreements contain a number of provisions for the Special and Diﬀerential
(S&D) treatment of developing countries, granting them special rights and privileges
and allowing developed countries to give them preferential concessions. S&D provisions
include a protection component, in the form of longer time periods for developing
countries to implement their tariﬀ commitments, and an access component, in the
form of preferential access to the markets of developed countries under the Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP).1 Both components are intended to be temporary: tariﬀ
bindings must be complied with at the end of the implementation period; and GSP
status is revoked once the granting country determines, on the basis of certain stated
criteria, that the beneficiary developing country no longer has a need for it.
The wording of the relevant WTO articles suggests that S&D rules do not just
reflect a passive acknowledgement of special needs: one of the stated objectives of
S&D rules is to “ensure that developing countries, and especially the least-developed
among them, secure a share in the growth of world trade commensurate with their
needs.”2 S&D provisions thus appear to be intended as an integral part of a deliberate
strategy for encouraging trade liberalization in developing countries.
Yet, S&D rules have been criticized precisely on the ground that they do not produce
trade liberalization incentives. In particular, it has been argued that S&D provisions,
by formally recognizing the status quo, do not encourage trade policy reform in develop-
ing countries; on the contrary, they violate the principle of reciprocity–which requires
countries to lower their trade barriers together–and thus release developing countries
from GATT obligations (Roessler, 1998). At first sight, empirical evidence would seem
to lend support to this view, suggesting that developing countries that are withdrawn
from GSP indeed become less protectionist. For example, Korea cut average nominal
tariﬀs by six percent after being dropped from the US GSP program; similarly, Samoa,
after being graduated, announced a drastic liberalization program aimed at eliminating
all tariﬀs by 2010. These trade policy patterns have been interpreted as evidence that
S&D treatment delays developing country liberalization (Özden and Reinhardt, 2003).
The objective of this paper is to provide an explanation for this theoretical puzzle:
how can observed S&D provisions be reconciled with their stated objectives? To make
sense of this puzzle, we need to take a closer look at the idea of reciprocity. Although
1GSP is legitimized under the 1979 Enabling Clause, which allows GATT/WTO members to
suspend the granting of most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment in cases where they are oﬀering lower-
than-MFN tariﬀs to developing countries.
2Preamble of Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO.
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the articles of GATT/WTO do not provide a precise definition of reciprocity, they
refer to the exchange of “reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed
to the substantial reduction of tariﬀs and other barriers to trade” and stress the idea
that trade concessions should be “substantially equivalent”.3 Reciprocity is sometimes
interpreted as implying conditionality, i.e. one party’s concessions being conditional on
the other’s. However, exchange of concessions and conditionality are distinct concepts,
since comparable concessions can take place bilaterally but unconditionally. Moreover,
whether or not conditionality is present cannot be determined solely on the basis of the
letter of legal documents, since conditionality can exist implicitly. Another relevant
distinction concerns the timing of mutual concessions: reciprocal concessions might
occur simultaneously or materialize at diﬀerent times.
Reciprocal liberalization, conditionality, and simultaneity are separate attributes,
which can combine in diﬀerent ways in a given outcome. Yet, these distinctions have
remained blurred in the debate on S&D. For example, Roessler appears to take the
principle of reciprocity as implying conditionality and simultaneity; and then to take
the absence of simultaneous concessions to imply that no conditionality is present.
The same applies to the observation that countries lower their trade barriers once they
have graduated from GSP: this may simply reflect a temporal lag between reciprocal
concessions, rather than GSP graduation directly inducing countries to liberalize.
In this paper, we show that temporary S&D treatment, in both its market-access
and protection components, can be rationalized as a transitional cooperative regime be-
tween a small developing country and a large developed country, where concessions are
reciprocal but non-simultaneous, and are linked, explicitly or implicitly, by condition-
ality.4 This interpretation of S&D rules relies crucially on recognizing that cooperative
trade policy outcomes must be self-enforcing: in the absence of a supranational agency
with direct power to punish violators, trade policy cooperation must be sustained by
3Much of the policy debate on reciprocity revolves around the problem of measuring and comparing
the significance of diﬀerent concessions (see Finger and Winters, 2002).
4Explicit elements of conditionality are often included in GSP programs. For example, one of the
conditions for a country to be eligible to GSP preferences by the United States is “the extent to
which the country has assured the United States it will provide equitable and reasonable access to
its markets” (see Section 502(c)6 of the US Trade Act of 1974). Also, under the US African Growth
and Opportunity Act (AGOA) passed in 2000, GSP is extended for Sub-Saharan African beneficiary
countries for seven years longer than in the rest of the world and qualify for an expanded list of GSP
products beyond that available for other geographic areas. However, eligible AGOA recipients should
eliminate their “barriers to US trade and investment”. In December 2003, the United States dropped
the Central African Republic and Eritrea from the list of AGOA beneficiary countries because they
did not meet eligibility requirements.
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mutual and continuously renewed threats of credible punishment of defections (Bagwell
and Staiger, 1997; Maggi, 1999; Ederington, 2001). It is only when we look at S&D
rules from this perspective that we can make sense of their temporal pattern.
We develop our arguments in a large-small two-country model of trade and protec-
tion lobbying. Our modelling choices are based on the following set of observations:
(i) least developed countries (LDCs)5 receive much stronger S&D preferences than
other developing countries; being small market players, LDCs should find it in their
interest to liberalize unilaterally, but seem unable to do so;6 (ii) special interests exert
significant influence on trade policy formation, both in developed and developing coun-
tries; (iii) S&D preferences are granted on a temporary basis; it would thus seem that
the obstacles that these countries face are viewed by all parties as being transitory.
As a natural way of rationalizing the apparent gap between short-run protection in-
centives and long-run liberalization incentives (premise (i) above), we assume that poli-
cymakers in the small country suﬀer from a commitment problem.7 In turn, we describe
this time consistency problem as being related to pressure from import-competing
groups (premise (ii)). We show that the presence of a commitment problem in the
small developing country is crucial in explaining the scope for trade cooperation with
the large developed country, and that the temporary nature of S&D treatment (premise
(iii)) can be explained by the combined presence of a commitment problem and stock
eﬀects: if capital stocks in small country’s import competing sector can adjust quickly,
a “jump” to a long-run trade agreement may be feasible; however, if capacity depreci-
ates slowly, the small country will be facing transitional constraints. In this case, we
show that a self-enforcing transition agreement will necessarily feature higher protec-
tion in the small country in comparison with long-run equilibrium tariﬀs (i.e. delayed
5Forty-nine countries are currently designated by the United Nations and the World Bank as LDCs.
The current criteria are: low national income (per capita GDP under $900 for countries now joining
the list), weak human assets (a composite index based on health, nutrition and education indicators)
and high economic vulnerability (a composite index based on indicators of instability of agricultural
production and exports, inadequate diversification and economic smallness). Diﬀerent thresholds are
used for addition to, and graduation from, the list of LDCs. A country qualifies for addition to the list
if it meets inclusion thresholds on all three criteria, and if its population does not exceed 75 million.
6The simple average MFN tariﬀ of LDCs in 2000 was eighteen percent, which was higher than
that of other developing countries (fifteen percent) and well above that of industrial countries (five
percent). See IMF information Database (TIPID).
7The idea that policy discretion might provide governments with an incentive to renege on earlier
promises and that this incentive could undermine the sustainability of optimal government policies
was introduced in the seminal paper by Kydland and Prescott (1977). Time inconsistency problems
often arise in international trade policy, as shown by Staiger and Tabellini (1987), Matsuyama (1990),
Tornell (1991), and Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998).
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implementation); and, under certain conditions, lower protection by the large country
will also be required (i.e. temporary GSP concessions).
Our analysis deals exclusively with the trade-related incentives associated with S&D
rules. Any economic gains a large country may experience from gaining access to a
small country market will, by definition, be perceived by the large country as being
small, and could therefore be overshadowed by other considerations (e.g. relating to
defense or security concerns, or even to altruistic motives) in shaping the large country’s
trade policies. While we do not deny that this may the case, we show that it is possible
to rationalize S&D provisions solely on the basis of trade-related incentives.
We show that, when viewed in the context of self-enforcing cooperation, the market-
access and protection components of S&D, even though they are not formally tied,
become linked by conditionality both within and across periods: in each period, co-
operative policies are sustained by the threat of future punishment; at the same time,
concessions are exchanged across diﬀerent time periods–with the large country oﬀering
temporary preferences in exchange for future market access, and the small country’s
determination to disentangle itself from its commitment problem being shored up by
the prospect of facing future punishment by the large country for failing to succeed.
The interpretation of temporary S&D provisions as part of a carrot-and-stick mech-
anism to help the developing country to overcome their transitional institutional prob-
lems and to liberalize their economies is in line with the stated objectives of the law.8
As stressed by Michalopoulos (2000), “the fundamental justification for the extension
of additional time to implement agreed measures relates to weaknesses in the institu-
tional capacity of developing and least developed countries. It is assumed that, given
additional time (as well as technical assistance, which is often also expected to be pro-
vided in these areas), developing and least developed countries will strengthen their
institutions in ways that would enable them to implement the agreements” (p. 22).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes
the evolution of S&D provisions in the GATT/WTO. Section 3 presents the main
features of our model, focusing on a single round of strategic interaction (the stage
game). Section 4 looks at the long-run trade agreements that can be sustained under
repeated interaction. Section 5 discusses existing S&D rules as transitional cooperative
regimes, when capacity constraints make it impossible to immediately reach a low-
8Existing work by Coates and Ludema (2001) and Krishna and Mitra (2003) shows that permanent
unilateral concession by a large developed country can be part of a system of incentives designed by the
large country to induce liberalization in a small developing country. Their analysis can thus explain
how permanent unilateral liberalization by a large developed country (“trade policy leadership,” in
the words of Coates and Ludema, 2001) can encourage liberalization by a small developing country,
but cannot provide a rationale for both components of S&D treatment and for their temporary nature.
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tariﬀ agreement. Section 6 discusses competing explanations. Section 7 examines
the conditions under which S&D treatment could be granted unilaterally. Section 8
concludes.
2 A Brief History of S&D Rules
As mentioned earlier, current S&D provisions consists mainly of longer implementation
periods and GSP preferences, both of which are temporary in nature: implementation
periods are transitory by definition,9 while GSP preferences are lost upon “graduation,”
i.e. when a beneficiary country is deemed by the granting country to have attained
a suﬃcient level of progress. Also, there is a strong emphasis on meeting the special
needs of the LDCs, which are granted even longer implementation periods10 and more
favourable GSP preferences.11
Since the early years of the GATT, both developed and developing countries have
long accepted the concept of S&D treatment, but its interpretation and implementation
in terms of legal rules have evolved significantly over time (see Michalopoulos, 2000,
and Whalley, 1999).
Until the early 1980s,12 S&D treatment was primarily meant to meet the special
problems of development faced by developing countries, according them special rights
9The length of the transition periods for developing countries varies considerably: from two years
(SPS and Import Licensing), five years (TRIMs, Custom Valuation, and TRIPS), ten years (agricul-
ture) and even up to an undetermined time (GATS).
10For example, the agreement on TRIPs required industrialized countries to implement its provisions
within one year and granted developing countries a transition period of five years (extendable to ten
years for technology sectors where no previous intellectual property protection was accorded). For
LDCs the allowed delay was eleven years.
11For example, LDCs may receive duty-free benefits under the US GSP program for some products
otherwise exempted from the program. Granting GSP preferences to developing countries other than
LDCs has become less attractive as a policy option for the granting countries, due to the tightening
of the WTO rules and procedures on waivers. New rules and procedures on waivers are specified by
the Understanding in Respect of Waivers and Obligations under GATT 1994 (Article IX).
12The important milestones in this period are: (i) the modification of Article XVIII of GATT in
1954-55 to allow developing countries to use trade restrictions for balance-of-payments purposes and
infant industry protection; (ii) the establishment of UNCTAD and the creation of the Committee on
Trade and Development in the GATT in 1964; (iii) the addition of Part IV on Trade and Development
to the GATT in 1965; and (iv) the adoption of the Enabling Clause in 1979, which, by allowing GATT
members to grant tariﬀ preferences to developing countries and LDCs without having to grant the
same treatment to industrialized countries, eﬀectively sheltered these sorts of preferences from the
GATT’s MFN obligations.
5
to nurture infant industries and to obtain preferential access to developed countries’
markets. The principle of non-reciprocity for developing countries (Article XXXVI) in-
dicated recognition of unequal playing fields between developed and developing coun-
tries. Preferential treatment took many forms: better market access for exports by
developing countries in accordance with GSP, so that they could boost economic de-
velopment through exports; a lesser level of obligations for developing countries which
provided them with the necessary flexibility to pursue policies for industrialization and
economic development; and no requirement for developing countries to sign and adhere
to all the agreements in GATT.
In the early 1980s, the situation changed rather dramatically. There was a broad
consensus that the past approach to S&D treatment had been disappointing in that it
had provided little incentive for developing countries to participate more fully in the
multilateral trading system (see Whalley, 1999). There was also a growing disenchant-
ment with the development strategy based on import substitution (see Kreuger, 1997,
and Bora et al., 2000). This led to a change of focus in the use of S&D treatment
from problems of development to problems of implementation. Such change of focus
meant that: (a) it was assumed that the level of development had no relationship with
the level of rights and obligations under the multilateral trading system; (b) the same
policies could be applicable for countries at various levels of development: all that was
required was to grant short transition periods and technical assistance; and (c) devel-
oping countries did not have the option to sign or not on the various agreements: all
the agreements were part of the Single Undertaking of the Uruguay Round.
In the last few years, development policy has moved near the top of the interna-
tional agenda. In particular, the WTOMinisterial Declaration that launched the Doha
“Development” Round in November 2001 has recognized the vulnerability of the least
developed countries and committed the global trading system to “addressing the mar-
ginalization of least-developed countries in international trade and to improving their
eﬀective participation.” Paragraph 44 of the Doha declaration states that “all special
and diﬀerential treatment provisions shall be reviewed with a view to strengthening
them and making them more precise, eﬀective and operational.” A total of eighty-
eight new proposals on special and diﬀerential treatment have been put forward, but
no agreement has yet been reached.
One of the main complaints about the current system is the fact that most S&D
provisions are not legally binding, either because they are not explicitly included in the
WTO agreements or because they are simply expressed as “best endeavor” clauses. For
this reason, the Trade and Development Committee has been mandated to consider the
legal and practical implications of turning them into mandatory obligations. Another
recurrent complaint is the fact that the transitory nature of S&D privileges makes them
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“eroding assets” (Stevens, 2003). There have also been calls for S&D treatment to be
granted in a nondiscriminatory fashion (i.e. in line with a kind of “Most Favoured GSP
Nation” principle.13
Our analysis challenges these criticisms. To begin with, including all S&D provi-
sions in the WTO agreements in the form of explicit commitments would not by itself
aﬀect their enforceability. Moreover, if a transitional S&D regime is required to help
developing countries to successfully liberalize their economies, one cannot say that its
value is eroded following graduation. Finally, our analysis suggests that discriminating
across beneficiaries may be required to deal successfully with diﬀerent individual cases.
3 The Model
We focus on the interaction between a small developing country–which cannot aﬀect
its terms of trade–and a large developed country–which has monopoly power in trade.
Crucially, we assume that the developing country has comparatively less dependable
political institutions, in the sense that its policymakers cannot credibly pre-commit to
certain trade policy choices, whereas policymakers in the large country can do so (by
relying on institutionally available commitment devices). This assumed institutional
diﬀerence between developing and developed countries, which drives our analysis of the
transition to long-run cooperation, seems to be supported by available evidence. For
example, if we rely on the World Bank indicator of institutional credibility,14 industri-
alized countries are characterized by much more credible institutions than developing
countries.15
As elsewhere in the literature (e.g. Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare, 1998), we assume
that the commitment problem in trade policy arises as a result of special interest pres-
sures. In particular, policymakers in the developing country are subject to protectionist
lobbying pressures from the owners of variable inputs.16 Investment decisions in the
13In a recent case brought before the WTO, India has targeted the EU’s GSP program for granting
certain countries preferential treatment in its eﬀorts to combat illegal drugs.
14This index—ranging from a minimum of one to a maximum of six–is meant to measure the
credibility of governments’ policy announcements. It was constructed by the World Bank and the
International Finance Corporation on the basis of a private sector survey conducted during 1996-
1998 in seventy-four countries. More than 3,600 firms were asked questions aimed at capturing the
reliability of the institutional framework as perceived by the private sector (Brunetti et al., 1998).
15For example, the World Bank credibility index is 2.37 for an LDC like Tanzania and 3.87 for the
United States.
16As we shall show later, lobbying by specific-factor owners should not be expected to give rise to a
policy commitment problem of this kind, since the influence of these groups vanishes ex post, given that
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import-competing sector are based on expected tariﬀs; ex post, investors exert pressure
for protection so as to maximize the quasi-rents generated by unanticipated deviations
of actual tariﬀs from expected tariﬀs.17 With policy commitment, tariﬀs are fully an-
ticipated and quasi-rents disappear. In the absence of policy commitment, however,
forward-looking investment results in ex-post protection pressure for policymakers,
which in turn supports high levels of investment in the first place. Therefore trade
liberalization–although optimal from a long-run perspective–may not be credible in
the short run.
The unilaterally sustainable level of protection in the developing country will thus
be higher than that which is ex ante desirable–even when evaluated from the point
of view of a non fully benevolent policymaker. This implies that such a policymaker
would have an active interest in pursuing liberalization, but may be unable to do so.
Then, S&D rules can be interpreted as a feature of an equilibrium agreement between
a developed and a developing country where both sides have a joint interest in helping
the developing country to overcome its commitment problem and liberalize trade.
The idea that a fully binding international agreement could be used to “tie policy-
makers’ hands,” enhancing the credibility of trade liberalization, has been suggested
in the aforementioned literature on time-consistent trade policy. For example, Staiger
and Tabellini (1987), Matsuyama (1990), and Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998) have
suggested that time inconsistency problems in trade policy could be overcome if gov-
ernments could undertake binding commitments through the GATT/WTO. However,
this argument neglects that, absent a supranational authority with autonomous powers
of enforcement, international trade agreements are not directly enforceable, but need
to be sustained by the threat of credible punishments between the parties involved.18
As we shall show, it is only when we look at the problem in this way–characterizing
the agreement as being self-enforcing–that we can account for the S&D provisions we
observe under WTO rules.
We show that, if capacity in the import-competing sector cannot immediately adjust
to the long-run equilibrium level, the developing country faces transitional constraints
and cannot immediately “jump” to the long-term deal. This allows us to focus on the
transitional process through which the developing country can move from a distorted
ex-post rents are constant. It should also be stressed that, in the absence of a commitment problem,
adding lobbying pressure in the large country would not aﬀect the main results of our analysis.
17The eﬀects of lobbying for quasi-rents by investors has also been examined by Grossman and
Helpman (1996), and by Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2002).
18For an analysis of the two-way relationship between domestic credibility problems and interna-
tional coordination problems, see Conconi and Perroni (2003).
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trade regime towards a more liberal one. A self-enforcing agreement must accom-
modate both transitional and long-run deviation incentives: a stronger transitional
temptation for the developing country to break the agreement and a correspondingly
weaker transitional temptation for the developed country translate into the transitional
asymmetries we observe under S&D rules. Our analysis shows that, in order to achieve
maximum liberalization as quickly as possible, it might be necessary to temporarily
allow the small (large) country to have higher (lower) tariﬀs relative to the long run.
3.1 The Economic Structure
There are two countries, a home country and a foreign country (represented by a “*”),
each producing an exportable good and an import-competing good. As mentioned
above, we assume that these two countries diﬀer in two ways. The first diﬀerence is
with respect to their size: the home country is assumed to be small, i.e. to be unable to
aﬀect its terms-of-trade, while the foreign country is assumed to be large, i.e. to have
monopoly power in trade. The second diﬀerence relates to their domestic institutions:
policymakers in the home country are assumed to be unable to precommit to trade
policy vis-à-vis their private sector, while in the foreign country there are credible
commitment mechanisms. In what follows, we will sometimes refer to the home country
as the small country or developing country and to the foreign country as the large or
developed country.
In the home country, exportables (domestically produced) and importables (im-
ported and domestically produced import-competing goods) are respectively denoted
by X and Y , which correspond to importables (Y ∗) and exportables (X∗) in the for-
eign country. Each country levies specific trade taxes, t and t∗, which drives a wedge
between the consumer price in the home country and the producer price in the foreign
country. For the purpose of our analysis, it is notationally convenient to represent
the small country’s trade tax as an import tariﬀ and the large country’s trade tax
as an export tax (relying on a well-known equivalence). The domestic prices of im-
portables are then pY = p∗X + t
∗ + t and p∗Y = pX . We normalize the fixed terms
of trade faced by the small country (net of any taxes levied by the two countries) to
p∗X/pX = 1. The domestic relative price of importables in the small country is then
pY /pX = 1 + t
∗ + t ≡ p. Consumer preferences in the home country are represented
by the following quasilinear utility function, u(DX ,DY ) = DX + v(DY ), where DX
and DY are, respectively, domestic consumption of exportables and importables, and
where v0(DY ) > 0, v00(DY ) < 0. Demand for importables and importables can thus be
written as DY (p), D0Y (p) < 0. Intertemporal preferences are additively separable, with
future payoﬀs discounted by a constant factor δ < 1.
Production of exportables uses labour and exhibits constant-returns-to-scale. With-
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out loss of generality, the constant marginal product of labour is assumed to be unity.
The import-competing good is produced using capital alone. In turn, capital (capac-
ity) is produced using labour and a specific factor present in fixed supply (e.g. land).
We assume that investors are individually small and forward-looking, i.e. they make
their choices on the basis of expected prices pE = 1 + tE + t∗E, where the E subscript
denotes expected values. At any given period j a certain amount of labour must be de-
voted to generate capital to be employed in the production of import-competing goods
in the subsequent period j + 1. The cost at j of obtaining an amount S of import-
competing goods in period j + 1 is given by ρC(S), C 0(S) > 0, C 00(S) < 0–with
convexity implicitly reflecting the presence of the sector-specific factor. Without loss
of generality, we shall assume that ρ is equal to the inverse of the subjective discount
factor of investors, δ, i.e. ρ = 1/δ. Then, through the profit-maximizing condition
ρC 0(S)/δ = C 0(S) = pE, we can obtain ex-ante planned import-competing supply as
a function of the expected price, S(pE), S0(pE) > 0. Once investment decisions have
been made, the ex-post domestic supply of importables is fixed at S = S(pE). This
implies that a divergence between expected prices and realized prices will give rise to
quasi-rents accruing to domestic investor and equal to the diﬀerence between the actual
and the expected value of the investment:
(p− pE)S(pE). (1)
3.2 The Political Structure
We assume that, after investment has taken place, investors successfully manage to form
a lobby–solving the free-riding problem described by Olson (1965)–whose objective
is to aﬀect trade policies so as to maximize quasi-rents. Note that before investment
takes place there is no identifiable interest group associated with quasi-rents in the small
country’s import-competing sector since entry into investment is free and expected rents
from investment are zero. It is only ex post that one can identify a closed group of
investors who share a common interest in increasing their quasi-rents. This means that,
prior to investment taking place, investors would be unable to commit with respect to
lobbying pressure to be applied on the policymaker–just as the policymaker is unable
to commit to policies at that stage.19
19The arguments we develop here would also follow through if investors are suﬃciently large that
changes in their individual level of investment have a sizable eﬀect on ex-post policies (e.g. the case
of a monopoly investor). In this case, investment decisions will not be made on the basis of expected
prices, and it will no longer be possible to identify quasi-rents separately from rents. Nevertheless,
even in this case lobbying would generate a commitment problem (as in Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare,
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Consistently with the political contributions model developed by Grossman and
Helpman (1994), we assume that incumbent policymakers are semi-benevolent, i.e.







S(z)dz + t(D(p)− S(pE)) + (1 + λ)(p− pE)S(pE), (2)
where λ is a parameter that represents the extent to which the policymaker is “cap-
tive” to lobbies. The payoﬀ of the small country’s government is thus a function,
Π(t, t∗, tE, t
∗
E), of both expected and actual tariﬀs.
3.3 Unilateral Trade Policy Choices
Suppose that the small country is facing a given large country export tax t∗. The
unilaterally optimal import tariﬀ for the policymaker in the small country is than
that which maximizes (2), given t∗. If the policymaker could commit to a tariﬀ level
before capacity is installed, pE would coincide with p, and there would be no quasi-
rents to lobby for. Unilateral liberalization would then maximize welfare in the small
country as well as the objective of the policymaker, independently of whether or not
the policymaker is benevolent. Thus, in this setup lobbying owes its very existence to
the inability of policymakers to credibly precommit to trade policy before investment
decisions are made, and policy commitment fully removes any eﬀect of lobbying on
trade policy.21
If policy commitment is not feasible, trade policy choices will have to be made after
investment. Then, for a given level of installed capacity, and for λ > 0, the optimal
tariﬀ for the policymaker will be above zero. Given that potential quasi-rents–and
hence lobbying pressure–increase with S(pE), the tariﬀwill be increasing in the level of
installed capacity, and hence will be an increasing function, t(t∗, tE, t∗E), of the expected
tariﬀs.
Investors, however, will correctly anticipate future tariﬀs and prices and select their
level of investment accordingly, i.e. S(pE) = S(p) = S(1 + t + t∗). Provided certain
1998) resulting in protection bias in comparison with a commitment outcome: the policymaker would
like to commit to a lower level of protection than that to which the monopolistic investor forces him
to by strategically increasing its investment. Whether this scenario or the one described in the paper
will apply to a particular sector will depend upon the degree of concentration in that sector.
20As discussed in Grossman and Helpman (1994), this specification can be derived from an agency
model where a semi-benevolent policymaker faces lobbies’ truthful contribution schedules.
21This contrasts with the analysis of Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998), who focus on a small
country whose policymakers suﬀer from a commitment problem but are under the influence of lobbying
by specific factor owners, implying that their optimal policy is not free trade.
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monotonicity conditions are met,22 this identifies, for a given constant t∗, a rational-
expectation unilateral equilibrium tariﬀ t = t(t∗, t, t∗) ≡ tR(t∗). Since investors ratio-
nally anticipate actual prices, the level of quasi-rents is zero in such an equilibrium;
nevertheless, tariﬀ changes produce a non-zero eﬀect on quasi-rents, which translates
into ex-post lobbying pressure and a positive equilibrium tariﬀ.
Given that equilibrium quasi-rents are zero, the term associated with lobbying pres-
sure in policymaker’s objective function vanishes in equilibrium. Thus, for a given t∗,
the policymaker in the small country will always be strictly worse oﬀ in an equilibrium
with tR(t∗) > 0 than under unilateral liberalization, and therefore the latter would
always be the preferred outcome for the policymaker, even if the inability to precom-
mit may prevent the policymaker from achieving it. That is, trade liberalization in
the small country is optimal from a long-run perspective but not credible in the short
run–a time consistency problem which traps the small country in a vicious circle of
ineﬃcient protection and ineﬃcient investment allocation.23
Consider now the large country’s trade policy choice. The policymaker in the large
country will simply choose an export tax which maximizes its surplus, given the tariﬀ
chosen by the small country.24 Neglecting domestic surplus–which can be taken as
constant–the surplus the large country derives from trading with the small country
22Since the capacity installed is an increasing function of expected tariﬀs and tariﬀs are increasing
in the installed capacity, the process could be exploding. We thus need to determine the conditions
for a perfect-foresight equilibrium to exist and be unique. Twice totally diﬀerentiating the first-order
condition for an optimum, gives ∂t/∂S(pE) > 0, ∂2t/∂S(pE)2 < 0. Assume monotonicity of the first
derivative of S(p). Suppose S(1 + t∗) > 0, implying that t(t∗, t, t∗) > 0 for t ≥ 0, and that therefore
t = 0 is not an equilibrium outcome. Then, a suﬃcient condition for a pure-strategy perfect-foresight
equilibrium with t > 0 to exist is S00(p) < 0 for all p (this ensures that there exists a level S0 such
that for S > S0 the diﬀerence 1 + t∗ + t(S) − S−1(S)– where S−1(S) denotes the inverse function
of S(.)–is monotonically decreasing in S at a non-decreasing rate and that it will therefore reach a
point where it is zero). If S00(p) > 0 such an equilibrium may or may not exist (but an equilibrium
either in pure or in mixed strategies will always exist by general principles.) Suppose S(1) = 0,
implying t(t∗, t, t∗) = 0. Then an equilibrium with t = 0 will always exist, possibly alongside other
pure-strategy equilibria with t > 0.
23Since we do not model growth, allocative eﬃciency–which determines the level of real income–is
the only dimension that can be interpreted in this model as relating to economic development, albeit
only in a very broad sense. Explicitly modelling growth, however, would not alter the structure of the
problem, nor fundamentally aﬀect conclusions.
24We could equivalently think of a scenario where large country exporters are oligopolists charging
a mark-up that falls short of the (surplus-maximizing) monopolistic markup, and where the gap
between the oligopoly and monopoly mark-up is bridged by an export-tax. Then t∗ would represent
a combination of private sector markup and export tax.
12
(the value of market access) is simply equal to the revenue from export taxation:
Π∗ ≡ t∗(D(p)− S(pE)); (3)
this is a function, Π∗(t, t∗, tE, t∗E), of tariﬀs as well as of the capacity installed in the
small country–which is in turn a function of expected tariﬀs.25 The large country’s
optimal export tax choice can be summarized by a reaction function t∗(t, tE, t∗E).
26
The equilibrium conditions t = t(t∗, t, t∗) and t∗ = t∗(t, t, t∗) together identify Nash
equilibrium trade taxes
tN ≥ 0, t∗N > 0. (4)
As we noted earlier, for any given level of t∗, a zero import tariﬀ would be an
optimal response for the small country, both in terms of maximizing the objective of
its policymaker and its aggregate welfare. When we account for the large country’s
response in a retaliation equilibrium, however, the presence of the commitment problem
in the small country, if it is not too severe (λ is small), may be beneficial to the
small country, as it serves as a credible commitment to set high tariﬀs, which the
large country may find it optimal to accommodate.27 Nevertheless, if the commitment
problem is suﬃciently severe (λ is suﬃciently large), it will still hurt the small country
in comparison with an outcome where λ = 0–e.g. if the resulting tN is large enough
to result in a shut-down of trade. In this case, even accounting for accommodation
by the large country, the policymaker in the small country would have an interest to
achieve unilateral liberalization, but would be unable to do so.
25Ex-ante capacity investment in the small country aﬀects ex-post supply responses in the small
country, and hence policy responses in both countries. Abstracting from capacity investment in the
large country, however, does not add another source of asymmetry between the two countries beyond
that which comes from size, since any short-run rigidity in the large country’s supply responses, related
to capacity constraints, would become negligible when considering interaction with a small country.
Also, abstracting from trade policy lobbying in the large country, as we do, does not crucially aﬀect
our argument. Lobbying would introduce a systematic source of protection bias in the large country;
but, absent a commitment problem, it would not generate the same structure of incentives as it does
for the small country.
26Tariﬀs can be strategic complements or substitutes, depending on how the import demand elas-
ticity changes with the price, but this does not aﬀect our analysis.
27In other words, the Stackelberg equilibrium tariﬀ for a small country may be positive.
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4 Long-run Trade Liberalization
The literature on policy credibility has appealed to the well-known idea that repeated
interaction creates incentives to maintain “reputation”28 and can therefore help over-
come policy credibility problems, or at least mitigate them. As described in Stokey
(1989), when the interaction between each government and its domestic investors is
repeated indefinitely, time-consistency policy problems can be solved by the use of
“trigger” punishment strategies involving a permanent reversion by the private sector
to the expectation of future ineﬃcient policies: the idea is simply that, if reneging on
a policy promise–even only once–entails a permanent loss of credibility, the prospect
of future losses can be suﬃcient to prevent a forward-looking government from going
back on its promises.
In this section we look at how trade liberalization in the small country can be
sustained under infinite repetition of the stage game described in the previous section.
We compare the conditions for the sustainability of trade liberalization when the small
country’s policymaker acts unilaterally and when it is in an agreement with the large
country. For simplicity, our discussion will focus on punishment strategies that involve
indefinite reversion to a noncooperative outcome, although our arguments can be easily
generalized to diﬀerent forms of punishment strategies.
Let us first consider a scenario where there is no trade agreement and the large
country always best responds to t. Then, a tariﬀ tL < t(t∗, tL, t∗), for t∗ = t∗(tL, t∗, tL),
could be sustained unilaterally by the small country in a reputation equilibrium where
a deviation from tL in any given period results in investors indefinitely reverting to
the expectation of a tariﬀ tN = t(t∗(tN , t∗, tN), tN , t∗(tN , t∗, tN)). This tariﬀ, tL, is sus-
tainable as long as the small country’s temptation to deviate, Π(t(t∗, tL, t∗), t∗, tL, t∗)−
Π(tL, t
∗, tL, t
∗) ≡ ∆(tL, t∗), for t∗ = t∗(tL, t∗, tL), is less than or equal to the dis-
counted loss from reverting to (tN , t∗N), which is equal to (δ/(1 − δ)) (Π(tL, t∗, tL, t∗)
−Π(tN , t∗N , tN , t∗N)) ≡ Ω(tL, t∗), where δ is the discount factor by which the govern-
ment discount future payoﬀs, which for simplicity we will assume to be the same as for
investors; this sustainability condition can be written as
∆(tL, t
∗(tL, tL, t
∗)) · Ω(tL, t
∗(tL, tL, t
∗)). (5)
The minimum tariﬀ, tR, that can be sustained by the small country in this way is iden-
tified by equality in the above equation, i.e. ∆(tR, t∗(tR, tR, t∗)) = Ω(tR, t∗(tR, tR, t∗)).
28Consistently with the use in some of the literature, the term reputation is used here to refer to
policy credibility in the context of a game of complete information. For a discussion of reputation in
games of incomplete information, see Fudenberg and Tirole (1996).
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Consider now a scenario where there is a trade agreement with tariﬀs (tL, t∗L) be-
tween the two countries sustained by Nash-reversion punishment strategies.29 Then
the agreement is sustainable for the small country as long as
∆(tL, t
∗
L) · Ω(tL, t
∗
L). (6)
The temptation, ∆(tL, t∗) is decreasing in t∗ and is therefore less for t∗L < t
∗(tL, t
∗, tL)–
i.e. if the agreement involves bilateral liberalization– than it is for t∗ = t∗(tL, tL, t∗).
A below best-response tariﬀ t∗L < t
∗(tL, tL, t
∗) in the large country also raises the
punishment cost Ω(tL, t∗L) relative to Ω(tL, t
∗(tL, tL, t
∗)), since the cooperative payoﬀ is
smaller in the latter expression and the punishment payoﬀ is the same. Therefore, t∗L <
t∗(tL, tL, t
∗) is a suﬃcient condition for an agreement (tL, t∗L) to facilitate liberalization
by the small country. Notice that such an agreement involves reciprocal liberalization,
with reciprocity being conditional on compliance by the small country. Intuitively, a
bilateral agreement canmake it easier for the small country to overcome its commitment
problem as it adds an outside carrot-and-stick inducement that would not otherwise
be present.
Proposition 1 The degree of patience (the minimum discount factor, δ) required
for the small country to sustain a given tariﬀ tR = tL unilaterally is greater than that
required to sustain tL in a relationship of conditional reciprocity with the large country.
For a given degree of patience, a relationship of conditional reciprocity with the large
country makes it possible to sustain a tariﬀ tL < tR.
Thus, conditional and reciprocal concessions by the large country, while not neces-
sary for trade liberalization to benefit the small country, may nevertheless be a neces-
sary condition for trade liberalization to be sustainable by the small country.30
29Nash reversion punishment strategies have been criticized by Farrell and Maskin (1989) on the
basis that they are not renegotiation proof. When only lobbying for quasi-rents is present, there can
be no scope for trade cooperation under renegotiation proofness. This is because, if the optimal tariﬀ
with commitment in the small country is zero in the punishment phase, any Pareto eﬃcient tariﬀ
combination would involve t = 0 and in turn this means that the large country would have to “punish
itself”. Long-run cooperation between a large and a small country under renegotiation proofness may
only be possible if there is some non-vanishing lobbying pressure in the small country (e.g. lobbying
by owners of specific factor in the import- competing sector). As we have already mentioned, our
setup can be readily augmented by allowing for lobbying by the owners of specific factors, without
altering the structure of our argument.
30Lack of reciprocal concessions could alternatively be characterized as the case where t∗ is exoge-
nously fixed, rather than being a best response to t. If we look at this scenario, however, we reach
the same conclusions as with t∗ is fixed: for t∗ = t∗L, the cooperation payoﬀ is the same as with an
agreement, but the punishment is greater under an agreement.
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The agreement must also be sustainable for the large country: its one-shot deviation
gain, Π∗(tL, t∗(tL, tL, t∗L), tL, t
∗
L) − Π∗(tL, t∗L, tL, t∗L) ≡ ∆∗(tL, t∗L) must be less than the







In order for both Ω(tL, t∗L) and Ω
∗(tL, t
∗
L) to be positive, (tL, t
∗
L) must Pareto dominate
the one-shot Nash tariﬀs. As noted earlier, for λ suﬃciently large, tariﬀ combinations
with this property always exist.
Note, however, that, if λ = 0, we have t = tR = tN = 0. In turn, an equilibrium
with t = 0 and t∗ = t∗(0, 0, t∗) would result in the highest possible payoﬀ for the large
country. This implies that, if λ = 0, and therefore the small country does not face a
commitment problem, one can find no alternative feasible tariﬀ combination that can
Pareto dominate the unilateral outcome t = tR, t∗ = t∗(tR, tR, t∗).31 But if λ, δ, and
δ∗ are suﬃciently large, one may find a sustainable tariﬀ combination (tL, t∗L), with
tL < tR and t∗L < t
∗(tL, tL, t
∗
L), which benefits both countries.
32 A reduction in t∗
accompanied by a reduction in t will always benefit the small country, and it will also
benefit the large country–raising the value of market access for the large country–as
long as the corresponding sustainable reduction in the small country’s tariﬀ is large
enough; in turn such a reduction will be sustainable if δ is suﬃciently large. Helping
the small country to overcome its policy commitment problem may thus also be in the
large country’s best interest.
This can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 2 If the small country’s policymaker can credibly commit to trade poli-
cies (or, equivalently, if λ = 0) there is no scope for trade cooperation between the large
and the small country. If the small country’s policymaker cannot credibly commit to
tariﬀs, for λ, δ, and δ∗ suﬃciently large, there always exists a sustainable, cooperative
agreement that Pareto dominates the unilateral reputation outcome.
31In this limit large/small country case, the presence of lobbying together with the inability to
commit are necessary conditions for the small country to be able to engage the large country in a
trade deal. The thrust of our argument would also apply to a scenario where the developing country
has some market power. In that case the presence of a commitment problem, while not essential for
engaging the large country in an agreement, would nevertheless broaden the scope for cooperation.
We choose to focus on the small country case as this best illustrates the commitment mechanism upon
which our argument is based (by isolating it from terms-of-trade eﬀects), but all the results that we
derive below for the small country case can be extended to the general case.
32If tariﬀs are strategic complements, it is possible for such an agreement to feature a tariﬀ in the
large country that is higher than the corresponding tariﬀ in a one-shot commitment equilibrium, even
when the agreement Pareto dominates a unilateral outcome with λ > 0.
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Thus, the small country’s inability to liberalize unilaterally may be instrumental for
securing conditional and reciprocal concessions by the large country: not only can the
small country rely on reciprocity vis-à-vis a large partner to overcome its commitment
problem, but it can also leverage on its inability to precommit to engage a large partner
that would otherwise have no interest in trade policy cooperation. In this sense, even
when it makes the one-shot tariﬀ retaliation outcome worse, the commitment problem
can be beneficial for the small country, which is able to “credibly commit” to high
tariﬀs in case of a breakdown of cooperation.
5 S&D Rules and the Transition to the Long-run
Agreement
Our analysis so far generates predictions that are in line with the idea that the small
country faces a liberalization problem for which it needs outside help–help which the
large country has an interest in oﬀering (consistently with the stated function of S&D
rules). What it does not do is explain the temporary nature of S&D treatment and
the simultaneous presence of its market-access and protection components. However,
as we shall show in this section, it can do so if stock eﬀects are introduced into the
previous modelling framework.
When capacity in the import-competing sector depreciates in a single period–
as it has been assumed in our analysis so far–transition to a long-run cooperative
arrangement, if sustainable, can take place in a single step. Hence, there would be
no role here for transitional S&D provisions. In the analysis that follows, however, we
shall show that, if capacity depreciates more slowly, the two countries face an additional
transitional constraint. Then, under certain conditions, a cooperative equilibrium path
will exhibit features consistent with S&D provisions. Suppose that capacity in the
small country’s import-competing sector depreciates slowly, but there is no lobbying
by recipients of quasi-rents. Given that the cost of the installed capacity is sunk, the
optimal trade policy for the small country is the same–a zero tariﬀ–in the transition as
it is in the long run, and so are cooperation incentives. Thus, stock adjustments cannot
by themselves justify the need for a transitional trade policy regime.33 As we shall show,
however, S&D rules can be rationalized as a transitional equilibrium phenomenon in
the presence of both slowly depreciating stocks and lobbying by recipients of quasi-rents
33Several papers, including Staiger (1995), Bond and Park (2004), and Ju (2004), provide theoretical
explanations for gradualism in trade liberalization. However, these papers cannot explain the structure
of existing S&D provisions and their temporary nature.
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in the small country’s import-competing sector.
In what follows, we will focus on an agreement (tL, t∗L) which, for given discount
factors δ and δ∗ can “just be sustained” in the long run, i.e. for which both (6) and
(7) are met with equality.34
Let SL ≡ S(1 + tL+ t∗L) be the equilibrium capacity of the small country’s import-
competing in such a trade deal. If, starting from a higher level, capacity can immedi-
ately be adjusted downwards, it would be possible at any point in time to “jump” to
the agreement (tL, t∗L). If, however, capacity cannot be instantaneously adjusted to its
long-run equilibrium level (as in Brainard and Verdier, 1997), the small country might
face transitional constraints, i.e. might not be able to reach the long-run low-tariﬀ
agreement instantaneously. To develop our argument, we shall simply assume that
there is an upper bound on capital depreciation and denote with φ ∈ (0, 1) the rate at
which capacity in the import-competing sector can be reduced from one period to the
next. Then, if Sj is capacity at period j and Nj is the level of new capacity investment
at j, the level of capacity at j + 1 is Sj+1 = (Sj +Nj)(1− φ).
For simplicity, in our analysis we will focus on the scenario described by Figure 1,
in which the long-run agreement (tL, t∗L) can be reached in two periods:
35 at period
j − 2 countries agree about their transitory and long-run tariﬀs; at period j − 1 they
implement transitory tariﬀs (tT , t∗T ); from period j onwards, they select long-run tariﬀs
(tL, t∗L). Notice that, starting from a certain level of installed capacity, S0, at j − 2–
inherited from earlier periods–and given the rate of depreciation, φ, it may conceivably
be possible to reach the long-run equilibrium in two periods, but it is not possible to
do so in one period, i.e.
SL
(1− φ)2 ≥ S0 ≥
SL
1− φ . (8)
This can be thought of a scenario where the transition to long-run tariﬀs lasts for two
periods, or, alternatively, as the final two periods of a longer process of transition to a
long-run equilibrium.
We can then focus on the one-period transition agreement, (tT , t∗T ), at j − 1, which
might be needed to get to the long-run deal, (tL, t∗L), at j. The long-run agreement
can only be achieved at period j if the capacity for period j − 1, planned at j − 2 on
34Notice that this is not necessarily the agreement characterized by lowest overall barriers or the
highest volume of trade; nor is it necessarily a constrained eﬃcient agreement. However, all Pareto
eﬃcient deals characterized by positive tariﬀs will have the characteristic of being “just sustainable”.
35As discussed earlier, the Uruguay Round Agreements specify implementation periods of diﬀerent
length, for diﬀerent developing countries and economic sectors. Our analysis could easily adjusted to
the case of longer transition periods.
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Period: j − 2 j − 1 j j + 1 . . .
Tariﬀs: (tj−2, t∗j−2) (tT , t
∗






Capacity: S0 S0(1− φ) · ST · SL/(1− φ) SL SL . . .
Figure 1: Transitional and Long-run Tariﬀs and Capacity
the basis of the tariﬀs expected at j − 1, does not exceed SL/(1 − φ) ≡ ST . Thus,
convergence to the long-run agreement at j requires suﬃciently low transitional tariﬀs
at j − 1, which must also be part of an overall self-enforcing agreement between the
two countries, i.e. both transitional and long-run tariﬀs must be sustainable given the
two countries’ deviation incentives and the punishment that accompanies deviations.
Note that the punishment for deviating from the transition agreement is the same as
the punishment for deviating from the long-run agreement: if a country deviates from
transitional tariﬀs at j−1, from j onwards it will face Nash tariﬀs (tN , t∗N) rather than
the cooperative tariﬀs (tL, t∗L). In contrast, transitional deviation incentives diﬀer from
long-run deviation incentives due to the fact that the small country’s import-competing
capacity is larger at j − 1 than at j. It follows that, during the transition, there are
larger quasi-rents to be earned in the small country, and its import demand is also
more elastic. In turn, this implies that the small country faces a stronger temptation
to deviate from the agreement and the large country faces a weaker temptation to
deviate from the agreement in comparison with the long run.
Let us first examine the transitional deviation incentives for the small country.
The capacity at j − 1 installed at j − 2 on the basis of the tariﬀs expected at j − 2
can be determined as follows. If transition is completed in two periods, prices will
remain constant from period j onwards. Then, we can identify a function S˜T relating
transitional capacity to the transitional gross-of-tariﬀ price of importables, i.e. S˜T (1+
t∗T + tT ) with S˜
0
T (.) > 0.
36 This represents the optimal level of capacity when there is
36Assume that the cost of installing new capacity at j is a function of the level of capacity installed,
in such a way that the marginal cost depends on the total level of capacity, and suppose that this
cost can be expressed as Γ[C((Sj + Nj)(1 − φ)) − C(Sj(1 − φ))], where, without loss of generality,
Γ ≡ δ/(1− δ(1− φ)). If the expected domestic price of importables from j + 1 onwards is pE–as is
the case in a long-run agreement with constant tariﬀs–the expected present value of the revenue flow
from the new investment is ΓpE(1−φ)Nj . Then, the optimal level of new capacity investment at j will
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positive investment at j− 2, otherwise, capacity will be S0(1−φ). So, capacity during
the transition can be expressed as
ST (tT , t
∗
T ) ≡ max{S0(1− φ), S˜T (1 + t∗T + tT )}. (9)




D(p)dp+ tDD(pD)− tTD(pT ) + λ(tD − tT )ST (tT , t∗T ). (10)
where pT = 1 + tT + t∗T is the domestic price (ratio) associated with the transitional
tariﬀs and pD = 1+tD+t∗T is the price of importables when the small country optimally
deviates from the transition agreement. It can be easily verified that ∂∆T/∂tT < 0.
Proceeding in the same way for the large country, we obtain:
∆∗T ≡ t∗D(D(1 + t∗D + tT )− ST (tT , t∗T ))− t∗T (D(1 + t∗T + tT )− ST (tT , t∗T )). (11)
Again, one can verify that ∂∆∗T/∂t∗T < 0.
Thus, during the transition (at j−1), the small country faces a stronger temptation
to deviate from the agreement in comparison with the long-run (from j onwards), while
the opposite is true for the large country. It then follows that
Proposition 3 In the transition period, the minimum t that can be supported in
the small country for a given t∗ and the minimum t∗ that can be supported in the
large country for a given t are respectively smaller and larger than the corresponding
minimum tariﬀs that can be supported after the transition.
This, however, does not imply that transitional tariﬀs must exhibit this pattern
in comparison with long-run tariﬀs. In order to characterize the set of sustainable
transitional tariﬀs we need to consider both unilateral policy deviation incentives and
investment incentives in the small country’s import-competing sector. Specifically,
given “just sustainable” long-term tariﬀs (tL, t∗L), sustainable transitional tariﬀs (tT , t
∗
T )
are identified by the following set of conditions:
be identified by the condition pE = C 0(Sj+1), as before. If the path of future prices is not stationary,
however, the optimal investment condition will be diﬀerent. In the case of a two-period transition,
the present value, at j − 2, of the revenue flow from a level of investment Nj−2 can be expressed as
δ(1− φ)Nj−2pT + [δ2(1− φ)2/(1− δ(1 − φ))]Nj−2pL. Then, letting ST = (1− φ)(Sj−2 +Nj−2) and
equating marginal revenue with the marginal cost of investment gives C 0(S˜T ) = (1 − δ(1 − φ))pT +
δ(1− φ)pL.
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1. For each country, transitional deviation gains are less than or equal to long-run
deviation gains:
∆T (tT , t
∗
T , S0) · ∆L(tL, t
∗
L, SL), (12)
∆∗T (tT , t
∗





2. For given expected tariﬀs (tT , t∗T ), capacity at j − 1 is less than or equal to
ST ≡ SL/(1− φ):
ST (tT , t
∗
T ) · ST . (14)
These conditions identify a (possibly empty) set of feasible transitional tariﬀ combi-
nations, whose characteristics depend on the parameters of the problem. In order to
obtain a more precise characterization, we employ a diﬀerential approach, which we
develop as follows. Consider scenarios where capacity depreciates just fast enough that
two period transition is feasible, i.e. where S0(1−φ)2 = SL. In such borderline scenar-
ios, if we take S0 as exogenous and make it progressively closer to SL, the sustainable












i.e. θ and θ∗ are the marginal diﬀerences between transitional and long-run tariﬀs in
the neighbourhood of a limit scenario with S0 = SL. In this case, it can be shown
that ∂∆T/∂t∗T = 0. Then, for S0 approaching SL and φ = 1 − (S0/SL)1/2, transition
to (tL, t∗L) is feasible from j onwards, passing through a single transitional period with
tariﬀs (tT , t∗T )–i.e. conditions (12)-(14) are met–if there exist a combination (θ, θ∗)











∂S · 0, (18)
(θ + θ∗)S˜0(p)− 1 · 0. (19)
For condition (17) to be satisfied, given that ∂∆/∂t < 0 and ∂∆/∂S > 0, θ must be
greater than or equal to a critical level θˆ = − (∂∆/∂S) / (∂∆/∂t) > 0. This implies
that tT > tL, i.e. during the transition the small country’s tariﬀ must always be higher
than the following long-run tariﬀ. We can thus state the following result:
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Proposition 4 When capacity in the import-competing sector of the developing coun-
try cannot immediately adjust and the rate of depreciation of capacity is suﬃciently
small, the developing country must always liberalize gradually. Therefore the tempo-
rary protection component of S&D treatment is a necessary condition for the transition
to a low-tariﬀ long-run agreement.
Consider now condition (18), which captures the incentive constraints of the large
country. Given that ∂∆∗/∂t∗ < 0, ∂∆∗/∂t < 0, and ∂∆∗/∂S < 0, θ∗ can be negative
or positive. Let θˆ∗(θ) be the minimum θ∗ for which (18) is satisfied for a given θ,
i.e. θˆ∗(θ) = − (∂∆∗/∂S + θ∂∆∗/∂t) / (∂∆∗/∂t∗). This value is negative. Substituting
θˆ and θˆ∗(θ) into condition (19), we obtain the following prediction about the access
component of S&D treatment (GSP):
Proposition 5 Under the assumptions of Proposition 4, temporary GSP might or
might not be necessary for a fast transition to the long-run agreement:
(i ) if S˜0(p) · 1/θˆ, there is no sign restriction on θ∗, i.e. the long-run agreement can
be reached in two periods with t∗T smaller, larger or equal to t
∗
L;
(ii ) if 1/(θˆ+ θˆ∗(θ)) > S˜0(p) > 1/θˆ, θ∗ must be negative, implying that GSP (t∗T < t∗L)
is necessary to reach the long-run agreement in two periods;
(iii ) if S˜0(p) > 1/(θˆ + θˆ∗(θˆ)), then a two-period transition is not feasible.37
Note that the critical values θˆ and θˆ∗(θ) are obtained for a given constant level
of capacity, and are therefore independent of investment responses: intuitively, rapid
transition will be easier the less responsive investment in the import-competing sector
is to prices.38
Propositions 4 and 5 imply that the observation that countries dropped from the
US GSP program become less protectionist–as stressed, for example, by Özden and
37The sum θ + θˆ
∗
(θ) is minimized for θ = θˆ.
38Quasi-rents in a given period have been assumed to only reflect the gap between unanticipated
prices and the prices that were anticipated in the period that immediately precedes the policy change;
i.e., once a change is anticipated any windfall gain or loss associated with undepreciated investment is
assumed to become sunk. If we instead took quasi-rents as reflecting the diﬀerence between the actual
value of the investment and the value that was anticipated at the time investment took place, then
there would be some positive quasi-rents arising from the undepreciated portion of installed capacity
when reverting to Nash–even if the punishment path is fully anticipated after a deviation occurs.
These quasi-rents would be larger in the transition in comparison with the long run. Thus, there would
be an additional reason for having comparatively higher transitional tariﬀs in the small country, and
an even stronger need for GSP treatment to facilitate transition, strengthening our conclusions.
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Reinhardt (2003)–should not be interpreted as evidence that GSP delays liberaliza-
tion. On the contrary, our theoretical analysis shows that a temporary reduction in
tariﬀs by the large country may be required to secure rapid transition, even if this
must always be accompanied by transitionally higher tariﬀs in the small country. Un-
der such an agreement concessions are linked by conditionality, even if only implicitly.
Furthermore, concessions are traded intertemporally (i.e. they are not simultaneous).39
Along this transitional equilibrium path, the withdrawal of seemingly unilateral
tariﬀ concessions by the large country is accompanied by increased liberalization in the
small country.40 However it is not the withdrawal of tariﬀ concessions that produces
liberalization; rather it is the implied threat of Nash reversion that becomes compar-
atively more eﬀective once transition to a long-run tariﬀ equilibrium has occurred.
Thus, GSP graduation does not necessarily mean that the “carrot” is taken away from
the small country: a carrot-and-stick mechanism will still be at work in the long-run
agreement.41
39Our analysis only focuses on bilateral trade in the absence of third-country trade. Accordingly,
we characterize preferences in terms of the diﬀerence between the tariﬀs faced by a GSP beneficiary
during the transition and the MFN tariﬀs faced by the same country after graduation. In a setup with
more than two countries, preferential market access during the transition is commonly understood as
reflecting the diﬀerence between GSP tariﬀs and MFN tariﬀs faced by non-GSP countries during the
transition. Such a diﬀerence has been shrinking over time as a result of continuing trade liberalization
on a MFN basis. For example, Amjadi et al. (1996) show that pre-Uruguay Round tariﬀ rates in
three major OECD markets (the European Union, Japan, and the United States) on the imports
of non-oil products from sub-Saharan African countries averaged 4.56 percent and the margin of
preferences was estimated at 4.25 percent. After the Uruguay Round, these figures fell to 2.68 and
2.47, respectively. In a multilateral environment, if the pre-transition MFN tariﬀ is higher than the
corresponding post-transition value, the eﬀect of a given GSP preferential tariﬀ on bilateral trade
during the transition–other things equal–would be larger because of trade diversion.
40Our analysis of the properties of the transition has relied only upon comparisons of deviation
incentives; therefore it is independent of the punishment strategies adopted (including strategies that
satisfy renegotiation-proofness), as long as the punishment for transitional deviations is the same as
the punishment for deviations from the long-run agreement.
41Notice, however, that it is also possible for conditionality to disappear in the long-run once
transition has taken place: nothing in the preceding analysis rules out the case in which the long run
tariﬀ is just the unilaterally sustainable tariﬀ, i.e. t∗L = t
∗(tL, tL, t
∗
L). But even in such a scenario,
transitional cooperation may be present in the form of a transitionally lower tariﬀ by the large country.
In this case, the large country would only be engaged transitionally to help the small country reach
conditions under which it can sustain liberalization unilaterally (through a reputation mechanism).
However, even in this scenario conditionality is present, albeit implicitly, because each country’s eﬀort
to facilitate liberalization must be reciprocated by the other during the transition in order to be
eﬀective, and each country is able to sustain lower tariﬀs during the transition only on condition that
the other country participates in the eﬀort.
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As discussed earlier, S&D treatment of developing countries has been criticized
for being in violation of the principle of reciprocity, according to which GATT/WTO
members should exchange “substantially equivalent concessions.” Our analysis shows
that S&D rules can be rationalized as a conditional exchange of trade concessions
across diﬀerent periods, when simultaneous reciprocal liberalization is not possible.
Our interpretation is supported by the explicit trade requirements included in some
GSP programs, such as the eligibility criteria for US GSP status. Also, whether or not
conditionality is present cannot be determined solely on the basis of the letter of legal
documents, since conditions may be implicit (tacit)–as is often the case, for example,
when concessions are exchanged across diﬀerent policy dimensions.42
As stressed by Youssef (2003), “S&D treatment constitutes an integral part of
the balance of rights and obligations of the Uruguay Round Agreements as a whole.
[Developing countries ...] accepted the obligations in the expectation that some of
their concerns would be addressed and dealt with through S&D provisions.” >From a
legal perspective, WTO rules need only allow for S&D provisions rather than prescribe
them. As higher transitional protection by the small country aﬀects all parties in
a multilateral system, it must be formally sanctioned by multilateral rules. On the
other hand, a lower transitional tariﬀ by a large country can be legally described
as a discretionary concession by the large country, which needs to be sanctioned by
multilateral rules (through the Enabling Clause) only to the extent that it violates the
MFN principle of non-discrimination.
The preceding analysis has established that the structure of transitional and long-
run tariﬀs can be consistent with observed of S&D treatment. It can also be shown
that it is consistent with the trade-test graduation criterion applied by many granting
countries, whereby GSP status is lost if its exports surpass a given threshold.43 In
the equilibrium transition we have described, capacity has to be declining (ST < S0).
This implies that the gross-of-tariﬀ transitional price (at j− 1) has to be less than the
pre-transition price (at j − 2). Hence the volume of trade will have to increase in the
transition.44
42For example, it has been argued that the United States succeeded in internationalizing labour
standards (in the International Labour Organization) over the longstanding objections of the devel-
oping countries because of the implicit threat to shift the forum on labour standards to the WTO,
where disciplines are more demanding (Brown, 2000).
43For example, a beneficiary developing country can be graduated from the US GSP program for a
given product if its yearly exports of that product to the United States exceed a given threshold (e.g.
$100 million per tariﬀ line or $13 million if the exporting country has more than a fifty percent share
of U.S. imports.)
44GSP preferences often come with many restrictions, product exclusions, and administrative rules.
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Furthermore, the equilibrium transition we have described is consistent with an
income-based GSP graduation test:45 given that ST · S0, and as long as the large
country’s export tax is less at j − 1 than at j − 2, welfare (real income) in the small
country will be greater in the transitional period than before.46
Results on welfare comparisons for both countries are summarized by the following
proposition:
Proposition 6 In the regime where both S&D provisions are present, the following
welfare comparisons hold: both countries gain in a long-run agreement in comparison
with a no-agreement situation (ΠL > ΠN and Π∗L > Π
∗
N); compared with a no-agreement
situation, the developing country will always gain by entering the transition phase of
the agreement (ΠT > ΠN), while the large country might gain or lose (Π∗T Q Π∗N);
compared to the transition period, the large country will always gain in the long-run
agreement (Π∗L > Π
∗
T ), while the small country might gain or lose (ΠL Q ΠT ).
Proof: The comparison between the Nash equilibrium (tN , t∗N) and the long-run tar-
iﬀ equilibrium (tL, t∗L) is straightforward: unless the two coincide, by construction,
cooperation yields a higher level of welfare for both countries than noncooperation.
Comparing the transition period with the noncooperative and the post-transition out-
comes, let us first consider the small country. Compared with the Nash equilibrium,
the transition phase involves a reduction in both tariﬀs, so the small country unam-
biguously gains.47 The welfare comparison for the small country between the transition
Preference programs often cover only a share of exports from developing countries, and among those
eligible countries and products, only a fraction of preferences are actually utilized. For these reasons,
in 2001, only approximately thirty-nine percent of eligible exports actually received preferential treat-
ment. However, the percentage is much higher for LDCs (around sixty percent), reflecting the fact
that they receive much less restrictive treatment (World Bank, 2004).
45For example, Section 502(c) of US GSP law includes the level of per capita income as one of the
criteria to graduate beneficiary countries. In 1998 the United States dropped Aruba, Cayman Islands,
Cyprus, Greenland, Macau, and the Netherlands Antilles from its GSP Program, after these countries
become “high income” (i.e. per capita income of $8,956 or more) as defined by the World Bank.
46Our model does not explicitly incorporate economic growth, so GDP growth can only be measured
here in terms of changes in real income. Nevertheless, our setup could be augmented to incorporate
growth mechanisms–including trade-led technological growth–without aﬀecting the nature of our
argument.
47Recall that it is assumed that λ is large enough that both countries are hurt by the commitment
problem. This means that the one-shot noncooperative equilibrium tariﬀ in the small country is above
the tariﬀ level which, if the small country were to best-respond, would maximize welfare for the small
country (the Stackelberg equilibrium tariﬀ). Therefore, for any given t∗, any reduction from tN is
beneficial for the developing country. Also, for any given t, a reduction in the export tax of the large
country, t∗, will always imply a gain in consumer surplus for the small country.
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and post- transition period is ambiguous: one can construct scenarios under which the
small country will gain by moving from the transition to the long-run agreement48
and others in which it will lose.49 Consider next the large country. Under the regime
in which both components of S&D treatment are present (i.e. θ > 0 and θ∗ < 0),
the large country must unambiguously gain from moving from the transition to the
post-transition phase, since an increase in its own tariﬀ and a fall in the tariﬀ of the
small country both increase its monopoly profits. In contrast, the welfare comparison
between the Nash and transition equilibrium for the large country is ambiguous: under
some scenarios it will gain50 while in others it will lose.51 2
Thus, both countries unambiguously favour the long-run, low-tariﬀ deal compared
to a no-agreement outcome. The issue is simply “how to get there ” if, due to insti-
tutional constraints in the small country (i.e. the existence of a commitment problem
and capacity constraints), it is not possible to jump immediately to the long-run deal.
Our analysis shows that this can be done through exchanges of concessions across time
periods: the large country might willingly accept a drop in the surplus it can extract
from the small country in the transition in order to secure a long-run surplus gain;
one the other hand, the small country knows that, after temporarily receiving S&D
treatment aimed at disentangling it from its institutional problems, it might have to
accept a welfare drop. However, this not necessarily the case: there exist equilibrium
paths under which the developing country will experience a progressive improvement
in welfare despite its loss of GSP status. In other words, the small country may favour
48Consider a situation in which, during the transition, the large country grants GSP by a minimum
amount ² (i.e. θ∗ is negative but tending to zero). In this case, graduation will have a negligible eﬀect,
while further liberalization from j onwards will unambiguously benefit the small country.
49Suppose that we are in a regime where θ = θˆ and θ∗ = θˆ
∗
–i.e. a situation where GSP is necessary
to reach the long-run agreements in two periods. Also, assume that θˆ = θˆ∗. Moving from the transition
to the long-run agreement, the small country will experience a loss in consumer surplus (due to the
increase in t∗). This may be partly compensated by a gain in consumer surplus (due a reduction in t).
However, the small country will also lose tariﬀ revenues. Hence the overall eﬀect will be ambiguous.
50Suppose that the long-run agreement involves a tariﬀ t∗L very close to t
∗
N ; also suppose θ
∗ is
negative but close to zero, implying that t∗T is very close to tL and t
∗
N ; since the move from the Nash
equilibrium to the transition involves some trade liberalization from the small country (i.e. tT < tN ),
then it must be that Π∗T (t∗T , tT ) > Π∗N (t∗N , tN ).
51Imagine a situation in which the payoﬀ of the large country under cooperation is very close to
the noncooperative payoﬀ, so that the size of the punishment under Nash reversion tends to zero.
Also suppose, that the discount factor δ is close to unity. Then it is always possible to have a regime
in which S&D preferences have to be so strong (i.e. θ > 0 and θ∗ < 0 are large enough in absolute
value) that the monopoly surplus experienced by the large country in the transition is less than under
noncooperation.
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the post-transition outcome not only relative to the no agreement scenario, but also
relative to the transitional outcome (no “asset erosion” need take place.)
Finally, although our analysis has abstracted from growth eﬀects, it is worth noting
that the mechanism we have described can be at work whether or not there exist
significant growth spillovers from trade liberalization: in this interpretation S&D rules
respond directly to problems of implementation, and only indirectly (if at all) to the
presence of trade-related development eﬀects.
6 Competing Explanations
The literature on trade and development has identified a number of diﬀerent mechanisms–
not based on political economy–which can also be responsible for protection bias in
developing countries: for example, tariﬀ revenue requirements, or trade related technol-
ogy spillovers. In this section we briefly discuss whether these mechanisms can provide
a competing explanation for a transitional S&D regime. We do not claim this discus-
sion to be exhaustive; nevertheless, it demonstrates that many of the mechanisms that
are usually thought of as being responsible for protection bias in developing countries
cannot easily explain the structure of S&D treatment and its temporary nature.
6.1 Revenue Constraints
It is well known that revenue requirements are a possible source of tariﬀ protection
bias in developing countries. The absence of well-developed formal markets and of
viable monitoring mechanisms makes taxation of domestic transactions diﬃcult to
administer; trade taxes then become an essential source of public funds–in many
developing countries tariﬀ revenues account for 10-20% of total government revenues.
However, it is diﬃcult to imagine how a revenue-based bias would, by itself, trans-
late into divergence between transitional and long-run liberalization incentives. On
the other hand, if lobbying by quasi-rent recipients is also present, the commitment
problem it generates will be compounded by the presence of a tariﬀ revenue premium:
a marginal premium on tariﬀ revenues in the objective function of the small country
translates into even higher tariﬀs, which in turn lead to a larger import-competing ca-
pacity, higher quasi-rents and so even higher tariﬀs. Therefore, the argument presented
in the previous section would only be reinforced by the presence of revenue constraints.
6.2 Technology Spillovers
Another traditional explanation for temporary protection in developing countries is
the infant industry argument. This can be loosely summarized as follows: import-
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competing production generates positive technology externalities which are uncorrected
by direct instruments (e.g. a production subsidy, which may have too high an oppor-
tunity cost in terms of forgone revenues) and which are more significant transitionally
than they are in the long run. This may justify higher transitional tariﬀs.
To focus our discussion, imagine that the technological spillover can only be gen-
erated in period j and has permanent eﬀects from period j + 1 onwards. Such a
spillover could lead to a productivity shift in the import-competing sector alone or
in the economy at large. Both cases would result in positive incentives for the small
country to engage in temporary protection. Whether the large country has an interest
in any spillover materializing, however, depends on whether this directly or indirectly
increases the value of access to the small country’s market. For this to be the case,
the productivity shift in the small country must translate into increased demand for
imports through income eﬀects. But even if this condition was met, the small country
would still have unilateral incentives to increase its protection temporarily, and so there
should be no need for the large country to facilitate the process. On the contrary, the
unilaterally optimal tariﬀ applied by the large country should by itself already con-
tribute to the expansion of the import-competing industry in the developing country.
Thus, there should be no reason for the large country to have to temporarily reduce
its tariﬀ (i.e. to grant GSP status), even if, for some reason, the small country was not
able to increase its own tariﬀ. The infant industry argument seems unable to account
for the observed structure of S&D provisions.
The need for temporary trade protection has traditionally been associated with
spillovers in the import-competing sector. However, the literature has also stressed
related mechanisms that operate in the opposite direction, such as the so called infant-
export industry argument first described by Bhagwati (1968) and trade- driven tech-
nological spillovers (Grossman and Helpman, 1991).52
Suppose positive spillovers arise from the production of export goods (or from
the imports that can be obtained in exchange for those exports) rather than from the
production of import-competing goods, which implies that a temporary increase rather
than decrease in the volume of trade above the free trade equilibrium level is required.
Even this mechanism, if considered in isolation from other distortions, is unable to
provide a rationale for S&D provisions. As in the case of infant-industry protection,
52According to Grossman and Helpman (1991), countries that trade in world markets invariably
learn a great deal about the novel methods that are being used to produce goods. They also state
that while it is true that agents in an economically isolated country might also acquire some such
information by reading professional journals, speaking to foreign experts, or inspecting prototype
products, it seems that the contacts that develop through commercial interaction play an important
part in the international exchange of information and ideas.
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the large country would only have an interest in the spillover occurring if it increased
the value of market access.53 In this case, the small country will also have an interest
in temporarily subsidizing its trade, as long as the long-rung gain exceeds the short-
run cost of doing so. If this latter condition is not met, then it is possible that the
large country would find it optimal to subsidize trade instead (for example, the small
country might discount future gains less than the small country).
The above mechanism could then explain temporary GSP preferences; however, it
could not explain the simultaneous application of temporary protection, given that
neither country could gain from trade reducing measures. It is only when we also
invoke some other temporary source of protection bias that we can account for both
components of S&D. For example, the small country could have limited flexibility in
reducing its trade taxes because of revenue requirements. A permanent expansion
of trade due to a permanent increase in import demand, could ease the eﬀects of
revenue requirements in the long run. This explanation, which is based on a diﬀerent
institutional mechanism from those present in our previous analysis, would nevertheless
lead to similar conclusions with respect to the interpretation of S&D rules as implying
conditionality: the small country would be induced to adopt lower levels of taxation–
both during in the transition and in the long run–by the credible threat of the large
country raising its tariﬀs; vice-versa, the large country would be induced to grant GSP
during the transition phase by the prospect of the small country being permanently
locked in a high-tariﬀ equilibrium.
7 S&D Treatment as Unilateral Concession
The analysis carried out in Section 5 provides an interpretation of the existing struc-
ture of S&D provisions as a transitional equilibrium feature of cooperation between a
developed and a developing country under repeated strategic interaction. However, the
granting of GSP status has often been interpreted as unilateral , despite the fact that
GSP law currently contains explicit elements of conditionality. In what follows, we ask
whether the model we have developed in Section 4 and 5 can be modified so as to yield
features consistent with a unilateral S&D regime, and, specifically, what institutional
framework would be implied by such an interpretation.
As we will show, for this interpretation to be possible certain institutional features
must be present. While these features may be consistent with the patterns we observe
53This could be the result of either a combination of technological shift plus income eﬀects, as in the
case discussed previously. Alternatively, it could have to do with a “market cultivation” mechanism
as described by Bhagwati (1968).
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for some countries, they are less so in the case of other countries, which suggests that
in those cases an interpretation of S&D regimes as cooperative may be more fitting.
7.1 Lobbying by Rent Recipients
As noted earlier, lobbying by rent recipients can explain the presence of a protection
bias but cannot by itself provide a rationale for S&D treatment under cooperation. It
can, however, make it possible to rationalize a unilateral regime of permanent conces-
sions by the developed country, as the following discussion shows.
Suppose that both rent and quasi-rent recipients lobby but that they do not exert
the same influence; specifically, rent recipients can exert more pressure than quasi-rent
recipients. Then, it is possible for the ex-ante optimal tariﬀ to be greater than the
ex-post optimal tariﬀ. In this case the policymaker of the small country may attempt
to sustain a higher tariﬀ unilaterally, and the large country may find it in its interest
to lower its own tariﬀ unilaterally in order to bring about liberalization.
Formally, let the policymaker’s objective be defined as Π ≡ CS+TR+(1+λ0)R+
(1 + λ)Q, where CS is consumer surplus, TR tariﬀ revenues, R is rents (producer
surplus), Q is quasi-rents, and λ0 and λ are respectively the premia attached to rents
and quasi-rents (due to lobbying). Let tU(t∗) denote the ex-post optimal tariﬀ in a
perfect-foresight equilibrium for a given t∗, and tˆ(t∗) the ex-ante optimal tariﬀ given
t∗.54 Then, if λ0 is suﬃciently larger that λ, tˆ(t∗) will be greater than tU(t∗). Suppose
that this is the case. Then the policymaker would attempt to support a tariﬀ tL, with
tU(t
∗) < tL · tˆ(t∗), unilaterally, i.e. via a reputation mechanism. The condition for
such a tariﬀ to be sustainable when the large country best responds to it can again be
written as (5). The highest tariﬀ, tL = tR(t∗), that can be sustained in this way will
be identified by equality in (5).55
Suppose, however, that the large country manages to sustain a tariﬀ below its best-
response level. Other things equal, a lower expected t∗ lowers S(pE). This results in
a lower ex-post optimal tariﬀ, and hence in a lower maximum sustainable tariﬀ tR.
The resulting eﬀect on the volume of imports may produce an increase in the value of
54The ex-post optimal tariﬀ is identified by −S + tD0 + (1 + λ)S = tD0 + λS = 0, which gives
(together with the forward-looking condition pE = p) tU (t∗) = −λS(1 + t∗ + t)/D0(1 + t∗ + t). The
ex-ante optimal tariﬀ is identified by −S + t(D0 − S0) + (1+ λ0)S = t(D0 − S0) + λ0S = 0, which gives
tˆ(t∗) = −λ0S(1 + t∗ + tˆ(t∗))/(D0(1 + t∗ + tˆ(t∗))− S0(1 + t∗ + tˆ(t∗))).
55Let Φ(tL) ≡ ∆(tL, t∗)−Ω(tL, t∗). Φ0(tL) is positive at tˆ(t∗), and, by continuity, in a neighbourhood
of tˆ(t∗). A maximum tR < tˆ(t∗) cannot occur where Φ0(tR) < 0, otherwise it would be possible to
raise tR further. Thus, either tR = tˆ(t∗) or, for tR < tˆ(t∗), tR is identified by Φ(tR) = 0 in the
neighbourhood of tˆ(t∗) where Φ0(tR) > 0.
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market access for the large country despite the fact that t∗ is lower.56 In this case, the
large country may have an interest in unilaterally reducing its tariﬀ.
Such an outcome would be characterized by t∗R < t
∗
N , i.e. a unilateral market-access
concession by the large country. In this scenario, GSP would be interpreted as a tool to
induce liberalization by a recalcitrant policymaker–who would actually experience a
higher payoﬀ without it–undermining the policymaker’s ability to support ineﬃcient
policies. No cooperation is implied here, although bilateral liberalization would take
place. A form of conditionality may still be present if deviation by the small country–
downwards in this case–triggers withdrawal tariﬀ concessions by the large country.
However, punishment is more eﬀective in this case if the large country can also keep its
tariﬀ down in the punishment phase, rather than reverting to its best-response tariﬀ,
i.e. if the large country’s tariﬀ concession is unconditional.
Rationalizing a transitional S&D regime in this way, however, is more diﬃcult.
Suppose again that capacity does not fully depreciate in one period; and suppose that
the large country reduces its tariﬀs temporarily from t∗j−2 to t
∗
j−1–assuming that the
resulting gross-of-tariﬀ price, 1+t∗j−1+tR(t
∗
j−1), is also less than the pre-transition price
and that this reduction is fully anticipated by investors (so that Sj−1 is less than Sj−2).
If t∗ is restored to its initial level, t∗j−2, from period j onwards, the small country would
have no problem reverting, at j − 1, to the promise of credibly delivering tR(t∗j−1)
from j onwards–given that the stock can adjust immediately upwards to Sj−2. So
for transitional stock eﬀects to translate into transitional constraints on tariﬀs in this
scenario, there would need to exist an upper bound on the rate at which capacity can
be accumulated. Then, starting from a low stock, eﬀects of tariﬀs on quasi-rents would
be small, making it more diﬃcult for the small country to immediately move to a high
tariﬀ (which in turn would keep the build-up of capacity in check). Constraints on
the rate of build-up of import-competing capacity are not inconceivable (e.g. if we
think of the accumulation of human capital) but are on the whole less plausible than
depreciation constraints.
7.2 Lobbying by Exporters
There is an alternative mechanism–still involving lobbying from quasi-rent recipients,
but on the export side–which can rationalize a transitional regime analogous to the
one we have described, but where S&D is nevertheless unilateral in nature.
56In other words, the “equilibrium” elasticity of imports with respect to t∗ is greater than the
corresponding ex-post elasticity, making the Stackelberg equilibrium t∗ smaller than its ex-post best-
response level.
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Suppose that both exportables and import-competing goods are produced domesti-
cally in the small country from nontraded goods through decreasing-returns technolo-
gies, and require investment in capacity. Let pH be the domestic price of nontraded
goods, and let the net-of-tariﬀ price of importables be normalized to one. Assuming ad-
ditively separable, quasilinear preferences, defined over importables, exportables, and
nontraded goods–with nontraded goods entering utility linearly–domestic demand
for importables can be written as D(p/pH) and domestic demand for exportables as
DX(1/p
H). Capacity in the import-competing sector, S(pE/pHE ), and capacity in the
export sector, SX(1/pHE ), both depend on expected prices and are fixed ex post. Quasi-
rents in the exporting sector are (1/pH(t, t∗) − 1/pHE )SX(1/pHE ), while quasi-rents in
the import-competing sector are (p/pH(t, t∗) − pE/pHE )S(pE/pHE ). For simplicity, also
suppose that rent recipients and quasi-rent recipients exert the same influence on pol-
icymaking.57
In this model, the price of nontraded goods is an implicit function of tariﬀs pH(t, t∗)
(determined by trade balance). Suppose then that dpH/dt is positive but less than one
in absolute value58–which implies that d(p/pH)/dt is positive. In this case, quasi-rents
in the import competing sector will be increasing in t but quasi-rents in the exporting
sector will be decreasing in t.
As before, the policymaker’s payoﬀ will be the sum of consumer surplus, tariﬀ
revenue, weighted rents, R, and weighted quasi-rents, Q. Then, the ex-post optimal
tariﬀ tR(t∗) can be positive or zero (disallowing subsidies) depending on whether dQ/dt
is positive or negative (dR/dt is always zero ex post).59 The ex-ante optimal tariﬀ, tˆ(t∗),
on the other hand, will only depend on dR/dt (since dQ/dt is zero ex ante).60 It could
then be the case that, for λ positive, dR/dt is positive and therefore the commitment
tariﬀ is positive, but dQ/dt is suﬃciently smaller than dR/dt that the no-commitment
tariﬀ in the small country is less than the commitment tariﬀ.
In this scenario, the policymaker in the small country would again benefit from
being able to commit to a higher tariﬀ, and if commitment is not possible, a higher
tariﬀ may be sustained unilaterally through a reputation mechanism. Then, as in the
scenario discussed earlier, the large country could successfully undermine the small
country’s ability to sustain a high tariﬀ by lowering its own tariﬀ, leveraging on the
57This general specification encompasses the scenarios discussed earlier as special cases.
58The expression for dpH/dt is (1 + t∗)D0/[(1 + t∗)(p/pH)D0 − (1/pH)D0X ].
59Equilibrium tariﬀs are identified by the first-order condition for payoﬀmaximization in conjunction
with the forward-looking condition pE = p, pHE = p
H(t, t∗).
60The ex-ante optimal tariﬀ is found by first substituting pE = 1 + t∗ + t and pHE = p
H(t, t∗) into
the expression for the payoﬀ, and then deriving a first-order condition for a maximum.
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small country’s commitment problem vis-à-vis its export lobbies–a mechanism that
is closely related to that described in Krishna and Mitra (2003). In the presence of
slowly depreciating capacity, one could rationalize a temporary reduction in t∗ just
as we did in our previous analysis: starting from a history of high tariﬀs, the small
country will have inherited a small exporting capacity, making it possible to credibly
sustain high tariﬀs indefinitely; a temporary reduction in the large-country’s tariﬀ may
raise capacity just enough so that the small country is unable to revert to a high-
tariﬀ, low-capacity reputation equilibrium. Then, following this transitional period,
the large country could revert to comparatively higher tariﬀs without triggering any
significant increase in tariﬀs by the small country.61 No cooperation would again be
present: liberalization by the large country would be a unilateral move used to force an
unwilling policymaker to liberalize by trapping her in a “pro-trade bias” commitment
problem. GSP would be used temporarily and unilaterally.62
For such a pattern to arise, several conditions must be met: there must be a perma-
nent (rents related) protection bias working against a transitory (quasi-rents related)
comparative liberalization bias. In turn this means that there must be larger marginal
eﬀects on rents in the import-competing sector than in the exporting sector, while the
opposite must be true for quasi-rents. Whether or not such a scenario is plausible for
any particular country depends on the types of goods that are traded by that country.
If we examine the list of countries and sectors granted GSP status, we see that in some
cases preferential tariﬀs favour traditional exporting sectors (such as agricultural ex-
ports), which we would expect to generate significant rents (e.g. from land and natural
resources) but not to involve significant new capacity investment.63 Moreover, there
is clear evidence that declining industries are more eﬀective at lobbying than new in-
dustries are (Grossman and Helpman, 1996; Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2004); thus,
61Krishna and Mitra (2003) do not look at transitional outcomes. In their framework, the endogene-
ity of lobbying derives from the presence of fixed lobbying costs, rather than quasi-rents; extending
their specification to capture transitional equilibrium preferences would require assuming that lobby-
ing costs are not only fixed but temporally sunk.
62One can imagine a fourth type of scenario, with both lobbying from both rent and quasi-rent
recipients on the export side, with the former dominating the latter. Then the ex-ante optimal tariﬀ
would be less than the ex-post tariﬀ. This would give rise to a scenario where S&D is cooperative in
nature but permanent (unless there is an upper bound on the rate of build-up of export capacity).
63For example, data from the United States Trade Representative show that the leading US imports
from Sub-Saharan GSP recipients include crude oil, unwrought platinum, diamonds, and cocoa. Sim-
ilarly, leading imports from Latin-American beneficiaries under the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI)
comprise agricultural products and commodities, bars and rods of iron or steel, higher priced cigars,
raw sugar, beef, and ethyl alcohol.
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a history of protection would generate an intrinsic bias in favour of import-competing
industries rather than exporting industries.64 Nevertheless, in some cases (e.g. some
East Asian and Southeast Asian countries), the interpretation presented in this section
seems plausible.
8 Conclusion
We have shown that S&D treatment under existing WTO rules can be interpreted as
a transitional equilibrium feature of a self-enforcing international agreement between
a developed and a developing country, where both transitional and post-transitional
policy choices can be sustained by each party because of the policy path followed by
the other. In our interpretation, the two components of S&D, even though they are
not formally tied, become linked by conditionality both within and across periods: in
each period, cooperative policies are sustained by the threat of future punishment; at
the same time, concessions are exchanged across diﬀerent time periods.
If the developing country cannot immediately shrink the capacity of its import-
competing industry and jump to a low-tariﬀ agreement, it will face transitional con-
straints. A self-enforcing agreement must accommodate both transitional and long-run
deviation incentives: a stronger transitional temptation for the developing country to
break the agreement and a correspondingly weaker transitional temptation for the
developed country. These incentives translate into the transitional asymmetries we
observe under S&D rules.
This interpretation reconciles observed S&D provisions with their objectives as
stated in the law, by showing that temporary S&D treatment can help developing
countries to overcome their institutional problems and can thus encourage them to
liberalize their economies. Temporary preferences can indeed produce a “ratchet ef-
fect” on liberalization incentives, so that they are no longer required once the initial
institutional hurdles have been overcome. Furthermore, contrary to the view held by
some in the policy debate, reciprocity (of the non-simultaneous kind) and conditionality
(cooperation) are consistent with S&D treatment.
Our analysis aims to provide an internal consistency check on international law:
64This pattern could be predicted by our modelling framework if we assumed that owners of un-
depreciated capital can act as a cohesive “monopoly” lobby, given that they are identifiable prior to
policy choices. Then, they could anticipate the eﬀect that their lobbying will have on the process of
transition, and hence they could attempt to sustain a comparatively stronger lobbying pressure by
reputation in order to delay transition. On the other hand, investors in an expanding export sector
would be identifiable prior to policy choices, and could therefore not form a cohesive lobby ex ante.
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we have described a model, which is very much in line with the current consensus on
how trade policy is formed, and which is capable of producing an interpretation of
S&D rules as facilitators of trade liberalization. We make no claim of realism for our
model; rather, we demonstrate that the observed structure of the law–and specifi-
cally an interpretation of the law that implies conditionality and cooperation–can be
explained if the perceptions of the parties involved are consistent with the model we
describe. Nevertheless, certain features in the law–e.g. explicit conditionality ele-
ments in GSP law–do suggest that this interpretation of S&D rules seems more likely
than one in which S&D treatment is unconditional. Also, we do not claim that a co-
operative interpretation of S&D treatment should apply generally, since in some cases
it may be possible to rationalize S&D treatment as unconditional. If conditionality is
present, it can operate implicitly, without having to be written in a formal agreement.
Nevertheless, to the extent that we expect written agreements to reflect changes in
the underlying equilibrium relationships, we would also expect the written law even-
tually to be more explicit about the conditionalities involved in S&D; but this would
not make S&D provisions directly binding, as some suggest, since their application
ultimately rests in the hands of the developed and developing countries involved.
The multilateral trading system stands at a crossroads. Will the Doha Agenda re-
generate the multilateral consensus that has been the hallmark of successive rounds of
trade liberalization since the creation of the GATT in 1947? Or will the Doha Agenda
collapse, possibly opening the floodgates for a multitude of preferential arrangements?
Success or failure appears to hinge crucially on progress being made on development
related objectives–to “secure beneficial and meaningful integration into the multilat-
eral trading system and the global economy.”65 Developing countries’ dissatisfaction
with the present system stems from a widespread perception that developed economies
have been the ones to benefit the most from earlier liberalization rounds.
In the ministerial declaration of the Doha Round, countries have “agreed that all
special and diﬀerential treatment provisions shall be reviewed with a view to strength-
ening them and making them more precise, eﬀective and operational.” Calls for reform
in the WTO S&D system have paralleled a shift towards greater emphasis on problems
of implementation. On the basis of our analysis, the current stress on the need for S&D
treatment to be transitory (rather than permanent) suggests a change in the structure
of liberalization incentives. And the emphasis on implementation problems, as well as
the explicit mention of conditionality in GSP law, suggests a shift from a unilateral to
a cooperative regime. Both changes would be consistent, in our interpretation, with
increased pressure from quasi-rent recipients on the import-competing side.
65WTO, 2001 (Declarations of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha).
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However, not all developing countries are alike, and diﬀerent individual situations
may give rise to diﬀerent types of S&D regime (transitional or permanent; cooperative
or unilateral). So, it may not be possible to slot all developing countries into a single
regime, and may therefore not be desirable to draw a legal framework which establishes
uniform rules applying to all cases.66
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